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Contracts-Municipal Corporations-Right of An Offeror 
to Withdraw Bid Before Acceptance 
Plaintiff, city housing authority, invited bids for construction 
work reserving the right to reject any and all bids. Defendant 
surety's principal submitted the low bid along with the requisite 
bid bond, the bond being conditioned upon the withdrawal of the 
bid within thirty days, failure to enter the contract and perform. 
The Commissioners of the plaintiff adopted a motion to award 
the contract to the principal "subject to the approval of the Public 
Housing Administration." The next day the principal notified the 
plaintiff of a mistake in computation of his bid and withdrew. Al-
most three weeks later, plaintiff approved the bid and the principal 
declined to execute the contract. Plaintiff sues defendant surety 
for the difference between bid price and next lowest bid. The trial 
court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, reversed with direc-
tions to enter judgment for defendant.1 
The defendant surety offered two defenses to the action on the 
bond contract: (1) An offer may be withdrawn at any time before 
it is accepted; and (2) Even if the offer was accepted, mistake 
vitiated the contract. The second point was never reached because 
the court allowed the defense in poin~ one. 
An elementary rule of contract law is that an offer may be 
withdrawn at any time before acceptance.2 The rule is predicated 
20 A public contract appears to be a necessary requisite for this type 
of suit. In the governmental field it is essential that competitive bidding 
be kept alive to insure stringent application of the taxpayer's funds. A 
different situation exists in a private contract. There, not only are a 
limited number of persons affected by the mismanagement of funds instead 
of the general public, but also in the case of corporations, stockholders 
appear to have a more direct control through election of directors as 
contrasted to the appointment of government administrative officials. 
1 Peerless Casualty Co. v. Housing Authority, 228 F.2d 376 (1955). 
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upon the assumption that consideration is necessary to the forma-
tion of a contract and that until acceptance there is no considera-
tion by the offeree. 
Although applied by the court, this rule has no relevance to 
the case. The suit was on the bond, a sealed instrument, which, by 
state statute,3 was presumed to have been executed for considera-
tion. The court converted the suit on the bond into a suit for 
damages for breach of contract by stating (1) that the liability of 
the surety was the same as the liability of the principal, (2) that 
the bid and the bond should be read together, and (3) that a bid 
bond ought to be treated the same as a cash bid deposit. Since the 
court treated the action as one for damages for breach of contract, 
the important issue in the case is whether or not ordinary contract 
principles apply to an offer to a governmental body in which the 
bid is to be left open for a certain length of time. 
A few courts have made an exception to this rule. The first 
clear-cut federal decision recognizing this exception was Refining 
Associates v. United States.4 ·It held that a bid on a United States 
Government contract, where the bid was invited under a provision 
that it would not be withdrawn within fifteen calendar days, 
could not be withdrawn during that time. The court relied heavily 
on Scott v. United States.0 In the Scott case the bidder was allowed 
to withdraw his bid but his deposit was forfeited. The Refining 
Associates case simply bridged the gap from the Scott case holding 
that a deposit was forfeited to its holding that the bid itself could 
riot be withdrawn and said that damages would lie. Whether or 
not the Refining Associates case follows logically from the Scott 
case is debatable, but even so the consequences as applied to the 
parties are completely different. The measure of damages in the 
Refining Associates case is- that actually sustained, but only by the 
remotest chance would a bid deposit forfeiture as in the Scott case 
equal the actual damages. 6 
Regardless of the dissimilar practical effects of the two cases, 
2 1 Williston, Contracts § 55 (Rev. ed. 1936). 
3 Ga. Code Ann. § 20-301 (1936). 
4 109 F.Supp. 259 (1953). 
G 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909). 
6 Id. at 525 the court states that the highest bid to purchase the govern-
ment land was 5¥4 cents per acre, but because of the withdrawal the 
government was forced to accept the next highest bid, 3¥4 cents per acre. 
That bid was $11,535 so it is mathematically certain that the government 
was deprived of considerably more than the $500 forfeited bid deposit. 
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it is clear that both bind the offeror for the expressly agreed period 
of time. Both cases acknowledge the general contract rule that an 
offer may be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted, and each 
considers its factual situation as warranting an exception. The 
Scott case does not state that consideration is not necessary and 
advances no theory for binding the offeror. The court in the Refin-
ing Associates case offered the rationale that where there was no 
mistake, unreasonable delay, or the like, there could be no injustice 
in holding the bidder to the conditions of the invitation for bids, 
and found consideration to leave the bid open for fifteen calendar 
days in the right of the bidder to have his bid considered fairly. 
The court said: 
Plaintiff submitted its bid subject to . . . [provisions of the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulations] and agreed that de-
fendant should have 15 days from the date of opening to con-
sider the bids. In so doing, plaintiff was accorded the right of 
having its bid considered on its merits, and this right was con-
ditioned on the premise that the bid would remain open during 
the time specified.7 
In any event if the court is advancing a vested right concept 
into government contracts it has found acceptance in Heyer Products 
Co. v. United States8 in which a bidder was awarded damages for 
expenses incurred in preparing a bid where it was shown that the 
government did not invite bids in good faith. The federal govern-
ment, then, if the Heyer Products case is to be followed, in enjoying 
special favors when dealing with bidders as it did in Refining 
Associates case, must reciprocate by good faith considerations of 
the bids. 
In the field of municipal corporation law there has been prac-
tically no break from the general contract rule. However, in 
Lupfer v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,9 although allowing a bidder 
to regain his bid deposit because the county had waited an un-
reasonable length of time before accepting (no time limit being 
set by statute or invitation for bids) the court said in dictum: 
A competitive bid submitted under statutory privilege and 
regulation is in the nature of an option to the municipality, based 
upon a valuable consideration, to which the principles of law gov-
erning options, generally, are applicable. The consideration passing 
is the privilege of bidding and the legal assurance to the success-
ful bidder of an award as against all competitors. Such an option 
pending action consistent with its terms, expressed or implied, is 
7 109 F.Supp. at 262. 
s 140 F.Supp. 409 (1956). 
o 87 N.J. Eq. 491, 100 Atl. 927 (1917). 
NOTES 
a vested right of contract, of which the municipality cannot be 
deprived, except perhaps by its consent, and is remediable at 
law by an action for damages, or enforceable in equity by specific 
performance, if feasible, or may be summarily dealt with by 
forfeiture of the penalty prescribed, To sanction any other rule 
would open the door to fraud, and render wholly abortive the 
legislative scheme for public competitive bidding.to 
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This result binds the offeror on the basis that consideration 
is found in the privilege of bidding-a completely different ration-
ale than that found in the Scott case but similar to the rationale 
of the Refining Associates case.11 
In private contract law the general rule has been seriously 
questioned in only two fields. These are firm offers and auctions 
without reserve. The firm offer is an arrangement by which a 
general contractor submits a bid in reliance on firm offers from 
his subcontractors or suppliers. An illustrative example is North-
western Engineering Co. v. Ellerman12 in which a subcontractor 
was held to his bid on the theory of promissory estoppel. 
The auction situation is expressed in the Restatement of Con-
tracts as follows: 
At an auction, the auctioneer merely invites offers from suc-
cessive bidders which he may accept or reject unless, by announc-
ing that the sale is without reserve or by other means, he indi-
cates that he is making an offer to sell at any price bid by the 
highest bidder. In that case after a bid has been made the auc-
tioneer cannot withdraw. . . .13 
It is submitted there are at least two policy considerations 
which should be considered when bids are submitted to govern-
mental bodies in which government officers are restricted in ac-
cepting bids to a greater extent than officers of private corpora-
tions.14 
Where the contracting agency is bound by law to accept the 
lowest bid or the lowest and best bid or by similar restrictions, if 
that bid is allowed to be withdrawn after bids are opened and before 
acceptance, the bidder is allowed to make an unreasonably low bid 
and if before acceptance by the governmental body, material prices, 
labor costs, and the like turn in the bidder's favor, he will not 
10 Id. at 930. 
11 See note 7 supra. It should be noted that the correctness of this state-
ment rests upon the premise that the rationale in the Refining Associates 
case is based upon a vested right concept. 
12 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943). 
13 Restatement, Contracts § 27 ( 1932). 
14 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-205 (Reissue 1952). 
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withdraw. In effect, the bidder is hedging his bid and if a favor-
able change in prices does not come about the governmental body 
is put to the task and expense of proceeding through the bidding 
process again or more probably accepting another bid, thereby 
losing the competitive bid advantages. The second policy considera-
tion is the patent possibilities of collusion among bidders which 
could result in considerable loss to the municipalities. For ex-
ample, a municipality requests bids on a certain project and 
receives bids from A, B, C and D. A and B collude-A submits 
a bid upon which he believes he will make a small profit; B 
submits a bid upon which he could make a· substantial profit. 
When the bids are opened it is found that A had the lowest bid 
and B the next lowest. A withdraws and B gets the bid. If A is 
the lowest bidder and B is third or fourth lowest bidder, A does 
not withdraw if he thinks he has sufficient margin to take the 
chance. Of course, A may not have the lowest bid or B may not 
have the next lowest bid and the scheme will not work, but 
where the bidders are few in number such as is the usual case 
where small municipalities are involVed, the mathematical possi-
bilities of working the scheme are manifest. If the governmental 
subdivision could accept a bid at the time of the opening of the 
bids without going through any statutory formalities of acceptance 
the possibilities of detriment to it are removed just as they are 
when an agent of a private corporation is empowered to accept 
any bid he deems best immediately upon opening. 
It is the time . lag between bid opening and bid acceptance 
in public contract ·letting which justifies an exception to the 
general contract rule which allows the offeror to withdraw at any 
time prior to acceptance. Ordinarily, a private party can exercise 
almost unlimited discretion in selecting bids and, save where 
there is a need for checking complex specifications, can award a 
contract as soon as bids: !ll'e 'opened. But, being restricted to the 
lowest or lowest and nest bid or the like, and also restricted as 
to finality of selection by tlie statutory requirements of ratification 
by a legislative body witn: its attendant slowness of action the 
agent of a governmental body is particularly vulnerable to the 
aforementioned practices of withdrawal of bids. 
This precise problem has not been decided in Nebraska but 
Nebraska, following the general rule, has held that the offeror 
may be released on grounds of mistake.U~ · 
1c; See Olson Const. Co. v. School District of ·Scottsbluff, 153 Neb. 451, 
45 N.W.2d 164 (1950). 
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It seems probable that the Nebraska Court will be faced 
with this problem and increased municipal activity makes this 
probability almost a certainty. It is submitted that where a revoca-
tion is not founded upon impossibility or mistake, serious con-
sideration should be given to a deviation from ordinary contract 
rules. It is true that even if bidders are not allowed to withdraw, 
all possibilities of fraud are not eliminated. Agreements to refrain 
from bidding among prospective bidders and collusion of all or a 
part of the parties who would be eligible to bid are other possi-
bilities. This does not vitiate the proposition that the proper method 
to deal with this situation is to follow the rule which reduces 
fraud possibilities as much as possible. 
HISTORICAL NOTE 
During the Civil War, General Grant complained of the problem 
thus: 
I learned from undoubted authority that there was a combina-
tion of wealthy and influential citizens formed . . . for the purpose 
of monopolizing the army contracts. . .. 
The modus operandi for getting contracts at a high rate, I sup-
pose, was for a member of this association to put in bids commenc-
ing at as low rates as the articles could be furnished for, and after 
they were opened all would retire up to the highest one who was 
below any outside person, and let him take it. In many instances 
probably they could buy off this [outside] one for a low figure by 
assuring him that he could not possibly get the contract, for if he 
did not retire it would be held by the party below.rn 
Floyd A. Sterns, '57 
16 Letter to Congressman E. B. Washburne, quoted at p. 151 in Woodward, 
Meet General Grant (Premier ed. 1957). 
